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In Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,' Lisa Bressman pulls
together two disparate traditions in contemporary administrative law
scholarship: one that stems from the work of generations of leading
legal scholars and the other that emerges, more recently, from leading
work in positive political theory (PPT) in political science. Professor
Bressman explains why and how theories ofjudicial control of regulatory
administration must take account of both how agencies function and the
political environment in which administrative decisionmaking occurs.
After all, administrative law shapes administrative politics in profound
ways. Congress configures administrative procedures in the shadow of
legal doctrines; moreover, courts are themselves deep in the business of
procedure-configuring, as modern American administrative law amply
demonstrates.
The idea that the enacting Congress enjoys pride of place in
regulatory administration and oversight is a normatively controversial
one. Even assuming that courts and agencies ought to act as the honest
agents of legislative principals, the structure and incentives of
congressional preferences change over time. As a result, the enacting
and current Congresses may be in conflict. While earlier PPT models
presupposed that courts would enforce the legislative bargain struck by
the enacting Congress, further reflection indicates that a serious
normative dispute remains about whether and to what extent that
enacting coalition should be preferred over the current coalition in
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Congress. In the end, it is one thing to say that Congress tries to stack
the deck in favor of certain interests and policies; it is another thing to
say that we ought to let Congress get away with it.
What does it mean to say that Congress gets away with it? Left to its
own devices, Congress can forge an administrative law that ensures that
both agencies and courts act as resolutely honest agents of the enacting
coalition. In other words, legislative preferences are implemented
through not only legislators' own police patrols and fire alarms, but also
through the courts' implementation of legislative will via judicial rules of
appropriate agency behavior and through judicial ruling on statutory
interpretation. Alternatively, we can suppose that courts ought to sit
outside the political process and determine as best they can whether and
to what extent agency decisions reflect sound governance and suitable
legality; in short, whether agencies are acting consistent with law rather
than politics. Congressional choice, in this latter framework, is posed
against administrative law; in the former framework, administrative law is
a reflection of congressional choice. Professor Bressman seeks a
reconciliation of these two competing frameworks. The journey is a
valuable one, for it is only by figuring out the special and often baffling
role of courts in regulatory administration that we can profitably
measure the PPT account of regulatory administration.
A. The Elements of Professor Bressman's Approach
Professor Bressman offers two seemingly conflicting principal
insights regarding the role of courts in implementing the agenda and
objectives of Congress. First, she explains how courts supplement
legislative efforts to control agency performance. The doctrines she
focuses on-in particular, the relationship between "reasonableness"
requirements and the reticence to impose hybrid procedures on
agencies-illustrate well how contemporary legal doctrine can be
reconciled with the PPT view of congressional control. She explains,
within the basic structure of legal argument, how key judicial decisions
facilitate legislative efforts to supervise regulatory decisionmaking. The
insight is essentially right, and it rests squarely on the PPT depiction of
the dynamics between Congress and the courts. Deploying several
pertinent examples of administrative law from this perspective of
congressional control, she provides a convincing explanation of how
judicial decisions that might seem like courts intervening to make
political control more difficult are actually consistent with legislative
interests.
Second, Professor Bressman explains how courts use administrative
law to safeguard sound administrative governance from the twin threats
of intrusive presidential influence and agency misfeasance.
Administrative law therefore can be viewed as a means of correcting
excessive political influence and assuring a rough equilibrium between
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Congress and the President. In this way, the PPT account, which focuses
on legislative strategies of control, can be reconciled with the traditional
legal model's account of courts intervening to rescue agencies from
baleful political interventions.
At first blush, these two perspectives on judicial doctrine and
strategy are in tension with one another. How can we view courts as
conrades-in-arms with Congress while also viewing them as guardians of
the balance of power between Congress and the President? Perhaps one
can reconcile these two accounts by drawing a sharp distinction between
positive theory and prescriptive analysis. We start with the notion that
courts generally try to follow the purposive strategies of Congress. This
alliance may be born of necessity (as would follow from an account of
courts as subject to legislative control) or of willing obedience (as would
follow from an account of courts as political actors). But, in any case,
the courts develop and implement various administrative law doctrines
in order to facilitate legislative control. Professor Bressman further
argues that courts ought to protect administrative agencies from
unacceptable political intrusion. In other words, she claims that courts
should behave less like faithful agents and political actors and more like
safekeepers of rule of law values and facilitators of sound regulatory
governance.
B. Integrating Professor Bressman's Theory and PPT
The principal problem Professor Bressman faces is a version of the
dilemma endemic in reconciling PPT and normative analysis more
generally: One cannot keep separate a theory of administrative law and
a positive theory of administrative politics. While Bressman's holistic
analysis is insightful, a more complete account can and must be given of
the relationship between these two perspectives on judicial
decisionrnaking.
We offer a short, rough sketch of what this account would look like.
First, consider the policymaking dilemma from the vantage point of
courts: Judges are interested in maximizing their own interests; for our
purposes here, we can stipulate that these interests include a mix of
objectives, such as furthering their own ideological preferences,
protecting the rule of law or law's integrity, and making good policy.
This maximizing strategy requires that their decisions be immune from
direct legislative or executive interference. In addition, courts will want
Congress and the President to face obstacles in overriding judicial
decisions.
With these pieces of the analysis in mind, we turn to judicial
strategy. Crucially, courts can impact the structure and parameters of
legislative and executive influence through the development and
application of judicial doctrine aimed at restricting the options available
to members of Congress and the President. Professor Bressrnan suggests
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that judges will do so in order to help "reconcile the administrative state
with the constitutional structure [thereby] helping to promote the
legitimacy of agency action."' This proposed function, while capturing a
key insight about the incentive structure of courts, supposes that courts
are in fact preoccupied with fidelity to the Constitution and, likewise, to
the legitimacy of the administrative state. Yet, courts have a substantial
say in what the Constitution requires, and further, the administrative
state's legitimacy is not a separate question, but rather is bound up with
judicial pronouncements of proper agency action.
Among the many examples from administrative law and its history
that illustrate this point, consider the Supreme Court's approach in INS
v. Chadha,3 the case striking down the "legislative veto" on constitutional
grounds. The line drawn in Chadha between exercise of legislative power
requiring compliance with Article I, Section 7 and the exercise of
nonlegislative rulemaking power is notoriously shaky. While the Court
was not against broad delegation of administrative power, they looked
askance at the particular mechanisms of power reflected in the legislative
veto. In the end, the Court sustained broad lawmaking-type powers,
while invalidating the legislative veto. Professor Bressman could
plausibly use Chadha to support her thesis: the Court intervened to
protect the constitutional structure of government. However, at the
same time notice that the Court could have decided Chadha differently
by emphasizing that the legitimacy of agency lawmaking stems not from
obeying the procedural requirements of Article I, Section 7, but instead
from the nexus between statutory delegation, legislative oversight, and
even judicial control. While legitimacy is an important element in the
constitutional structure of regulatory administration, it is nevertheless
one that is ubiquitously subject to judicial framing and creative
articulation through doctrine, rules, and standards.
C. The judicial-Legislative Partnership Revisited
We come then to the apparent puzzle raised by the two principal
arguments in Professor Bressman's article: Why would courts use
administrative law doctrine to maintain constitutional balance and
ensure administrative legitimacy when courts are so concerned with
implementing legislative strategies? The answer comes in discrete pieces
developed by scholars working squarely in the PPT tradition. One piece
flows directly from the general architecture of the PPT framework. First,
as Brian Marks observed two decades ago, legislators face a series of
intrainstitutional hurdles to overturningjudicial decisions that are within
the "gridlock region."' Because of the gridlock region, courts (and, for
2. Bressman, supra note 1, at 1805.
3. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
4. Judicial policies can become a "structure based equilibrium" and be "invulnerable
to change" where a Cotrt's policy falls irreconcilably between preferred policy choices of
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that matter, agencies)" can implement their most preferred policy within
the gridlock region without fearing congressional reversals.
Second, one of the especially formidable ways in which courts can
act to protect their prerogatives in the face of legislative and executive
influence is to use legal rules to prevent legislative overturning their
rulings. They do so strategically; for example, by splitting the original
legislative coalition that formed to pass the legislation. This action
lessens the risk of legislative reversal of judicial decisions that fall within
policy region where the coalition has been split. Therefore, within this
region courts can maximize their own interests and, where necessary,
implement their own regulatory strategies.
In what situations might courts be interested in following these
strategies? They are likely to do so in situations where the judiciary cares
more about certain regulatory outcomes and aspects of administrative
performance than does Congress. One area in which this is likely is with
respect to agency decisions that implicate individual rights and
fundamental fairness. There are two separate reasons to expect that
courts will care more about these issues than will Congress. First, courts
traditionally create and implement doctrines concerning individual
justice and therefore are more often engaged with rights and specific
justice in adjudication than is the legislature or executive branch.
Second, and in a more political vein, courts can and do use rights
analysis to negotiate the demands of outside interest groups. Of course,
these groups may initially bring their principal policy demands directly
to the legislature, with their arguments taking the form of "I want" or "I
need." However, they will also approach the courts as bearers of
individual rights, making entitlement-form assertions such as "I deserve"
or "I have been denied my rights." While this is a crude cut at a deep
jurisprudential matter, the salient point here is just that courts might
cherish hegemony-or at least priority-in matters of individual rights
the two legislative houses. See Brian A. Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence of
Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell 18-19 (Hoover Inst., Working
Papers in Political Science No. P-88-7, 1988) (on file with the Colnbia Law Review).
Gridlock also occurs in areas where those policies preferred by Congress make the
president worse off and will be vetoed, while policies preferred by the president make
Congress worse off and will not be passed. Therefore, subject to qualifications related to
the veto-override, any judicial decision within these regions is stable because it cannot be
legislatively overturned.
5. Ferejohn and Shipan show how the gridlock argument grants agencies a degree of
discretion. See John A. Ferejohn & Chales R. Shipan, Congressional Influence on
Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy, in Congress
Reconsidered 393 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., 4th ed. 1989).
6. Cases which may effectively split the legislative coalition are those whose results
are appealing to an unusual combination of liberals and conservatives, a combination
which draws these legislators away from their respective coalitions and thereby makes it
harder for Congress to cobble together a majority to overturn or modify the judicial
decision.
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and fairness, rather than in matters of administrative performance.
If this presumption is correct, then the judiciary will maintain, for
sensible reasons, influence and even authority in the realm of
extrastatutory administrative law, for this will give them leverage in and
over domains that most substantially implicate the institutional interests
of courts. While some skeptics allege courts care about fairness only as a
means to an end, we believe rights-creating and rights-inplenenting
adjudication is in the wheelhouse of courts; that is, they indeed do care
about the ways in which agency decisionmaking is more or less fair. Of
course, this interest is symmetrical with congressional strategies, as
legislators will also protect their important prerogatives to control the
processes of regulation and regulatory decisionrnaking, and will keep
judicial interventions more directly focused on policy at greater arms
length.
In the end, Professor Bressman has the point basically right: Courts
and legislators are indeed in partnership with one another. PPT can
enrich the understanding of the proper role of the courts in this
partnership by focusing attention on the strategies courts use to
implement rights interests-particularly concerns with individual
fairness (what Bressman usefully frames as attention to regulatory
"arbitrariness") -while leaving to Congress and the President
prerogatives over the content of social and economic policy. As the PPT
framework reveals, this relationship is also born of a purposive desire of
legislators to implement their preferred policies through, inter alia, the
careful design of administrative procedures and regulatory instruments
and a parallel desire of courts to assist legislators with these objectives.
And yet it is borne, as well, of an interest in judicial concerns with their
own institutional prerogatives and preferences.
In addition, viewing the courts as especially concerned with
safeguarding individual rights and administrative fairness also helps
illuminate the question of why and how courts sometimes look to the
Constitution as a source of rules for superintending administrative
agency performance, while, at other times, look to subconstitutional
sources of law, such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 or
administrative common law. In a similar vein, courts determined to
require heightened rationality and procedural protection from agencies
in the wake of the due process revolution's demise (consider Matthews v.
Eldridges and its progeny) sought to transform the rather incrementalist
approaches of Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automotive Insurance, Co.") into the sort of
7. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 USC).
8. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
9. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
10. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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synoptic rationality requirements that one would have thought
untenable or at least thinly supported by existing legal doctrine. In
short, judges are both shrewd and resourceful in developing strategies to
ensure that constitutional values-or, more precisely, fairness values-
are protected. Ultimately, more work is needed to illuminate the
dynamics of judicial choice among the Constitution, the APA, organic
regulatory statutes, or judge-nade law. The fundamental positive
question is how administrative law fits into the larger menu of legal rules
and strategic possibilities.
Other puzzles in administrative law have exactly this quality. We
ought to ask why the courts and Congress choose one strategy over
another in particular circumstances and under particular conditions.
Consider the fundamental question-traditionally the purview of legal
philosophers rather than political scientists or administrative law
scholars-of why courts produce general rules governing administrative
performance in some cases but very specific, limited rulings in other
cases. Notably, administrative law is itself made up of both wide-ranging,
even somewhat transcendent rules, as well as carefully tailored, non-
transcendent rules. Imagine a two-by-two matrix, with the rows
consisting of rules and standards and the columns of general and
specific instructions. The upper left quadrant best describes most of the
APA: rules of general applicability that all agencies must follow. The
upper right quadrant describes some scattered APA procedures (for
example, the prohibition against ex parte communications), in that
while generally applicable, the instruction is much more in the nature of
a standard-requiring the agency, (and afterward, the reviewing court)
to consider various factors to determine whether and to what extent
impermissible contacts have occurred. The lower quadrants can be filled
with real examples as well. The federal statute books are filled with
agency-specific procedures, some that are classically rule-like in content
(consider the plethora of agency deadlines in modern environmental
and health and safety statutes), and others that are much more in the
nature of standards (for example, the "best available technology"
instructions in the Clean Air Act). Viewed through the lens of the PPT
framework, the choice between agency specific and general rules and the
choice between rules and standards emerges from strategic assessments
by courts made in the shadow of congressional choices that also can be
viewed within a similar framework of general versus specific and rules
versus standards.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The answers to the puzzles described in the previous section and
others require continuing work by an eclectic collection of scholars,
some, like Professor Bressinan, with an informed and nuanced take on
administrative law doctrine, some with a large analytic toolkit to help
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shape and refine extant PPT models of administrative behavior and
regulatory administration, and still others with a scrupulously empirical
focus. The expanding literature in the PPT tradition suggests that
progress will come steadily.
One of the central, emerging issues is how to integrate issues
concerning the courts' longstanding preoccupation with individual
rights and retail justice considerations-a preoccupation that is well
understood by legal scholars but historically only dimly understood by
rational choice political scientists-with legislators' strategic behavior, a
focus of modern PPT scholarship. Scholars in these two traditions can
no longer chalk up their colleagues' insights to misunderstanding, and
real progress in this area will require a greater integration of PPT and
the so-called legal model.
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